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USAF'S ROLES IN SPACE SURVEILLANCE
Colonel Robert M. Kronebusch
Director of Missile and Space Defense
Plans and Programs
Headquarters Aerospace Defense Command
Colorado Springs, Colorado
ABSTRACT
Currently USAF SPACETRACK supports the U. S. space
effort in a variety of ways. Space surveillance
permits space objects to be detected, identified,
located continuously, analyzed, avoided, monitored
for status changes, and to have their decay impacts
predicted. These functions are performed in com
pliance with international agreement and national
space pol icy. As the U. S. and other nations ven
ture forward in space, new requirements will be
levied on USAF to defend our space investments.
The USAF SPACETRACK System is evolving to meet this
challenge.

INTRODUCTION
Projects MERCURY, GEMINI, APOLLO, VOYAGER, SKYLAB,
and VIKING are ju^t a few of the exciting space
projects of the recent past that most people will
"Live via satellite," is a
readily recognize.
te lev-is ion byline that people have come to take for
In the future, SPACELAB and flights of
granted.
the shuttle ORBITER, among other projects, will
elicit profound attention. Meanwhile, quietly be
hind the scenes, the United States Air Force (USAF)
SPACETRACK System tracks, catalogs, identifies, and
monitors over 4,600 objects in space; calculates
whether satellites might collide; predicts where
reentry debris might fall; and provides various
amounts and types of data to many government and
non-government organizations.

THE SPACETRACK SYSTEM
Within the Department of Defense, the Commander in
Chief, Aerospace Defense Command, has been charged
with overall space surveillance responsibility.
The Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) operates USAF
SPACETRACK, an integrated worldwide single manager

system, and represents Headquarters USAF as the
operational planning agency for space surveillance.d) When the USAF SPACETRACK System is cou
pled with other systems, such as the U. S. Navy's
Space Surveillance System and the Canadian BakerNunn cameras, the total network is known as the
Space Detection and Tracking System or SPADATS.
The SPADAT System which has evolved over the years
is made up of a wide variety of sensors; some, such
as the powerful optical Baker-Nunn cameras, are
dedicated to this mission; others, such as the
phased array radars and Ballistic Missile Early
Warning System, play a major role in space object
tracking while performing the uninterrupted primary
mission of surveillance for ballistic missile warn
ing. (2) All data from the SPADATS network enters
the Space Defense Center located inside the North
American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Cheyenne Moun
tain Complex near Colorado Springs, Colorado. The
Space Defense Center is a 24 hours-per-day, 7 daysper-week operation which processes more than 30,000
observations daily on the over 4,600 objects in
orbit. Since SPUTNIK I in 1957, the Space Defense
Center has cataloged over 11,000 space objects,
more than half of which have been deorbited'or have
naturally decayed from orbit.(3)

DOD INTEREST
With the rapid technical evolution of space activ
ity has come a U. S. dependence on space for commu
nications, weather information, attack indications
and warning, and navigation aids. Future applica
tions, such as the Global Positioning Satellite
System, will increase this dependence even more.
Trends in space activity indicate that there is a
growing awareness of this fact both in the U. S.
and in other countries. As a result, the evolution
of space activity over the 21 1/2 years since
SPUTNIK I has been matched by the development of a
sophisticated tracking network.
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ORBIT DETERMINATION

A satellite's elliptical orbit is classically de
scribed by six parameters: semimajor axis of the
ellipse; eccentricity of the ellipse; inclination
of the orbit with respect to the equatorial plane;
right ascension; argument of perigee; and true
anomaly at some epoch time. Any other orbital ele
ments can be defined in terms of this set of six
independent variables. As can be discerned, a satellite ! s position should be precisely defined by
these orbital elements. This would be true if it
were not for perturbations due to the earth's
oblateness, nonuniform gravitational fields, solar
radiation pressure, and atmospheric drag. In gen
eral, space objects virtually "dance around" in
their basic orbit due to the effects these anoma
lies have on their motion. Additionally, some of
these anomalies are difficult to predict. For ex
ample, the atmospheric model In the motion equation
provides only an estimate of the drag effects be
cause of the uncertainty in solar activity.
For routine studies, general perturbation tech
niques normally provide orbital element set accu
racies on the order of 12 kilometers or less In
positional error. When extremely accurate results
are required, special perturbation routines (which
consider more of the forces that affect sate I Iite
motion)" can be used. For example, element sets on
selected satellites in nearly circular 800 kilo
meter altitude orbits can normally be maintained
with a position error of less than 1 kilometer for
a three day prediction.

IMPORTANT "ROUTINE" FUNCTIONS
With the magnitude of operation in space surveil
lance, many tasks performed by the Aerospace De
fense Command have become routine. The word "rou
tine," however, must be differentiated from "unim
portant." The importance of ADCOMs routine func
tions can be partially substantiated by.interna
By United Nations agreement,
tional agreements.
the country which launches a satellite is solely
responsible for any damage resulting from decaying
satellite debris. Additionally, any recovered ob
jects remain the property of the originating nation
The comprehensive
regardless of impact area.
SPACETRACK system provides one method of monitoring
compliance with this treaty. Article 3 of the 1971
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Out
and
break of Nuclear War between the U. S.
U.S.S.R. requires the parties to undertake to no
tify each other Immediately in the event of uniden
tified objects if such occurrences could create a

risk of outbreak of nuclear war.(4) The Interpre
tation of this Article, of course, is that these
unidentified objects may appear to the missile
warning sensor system as incoming ballistic mis
The Space Defense Center catalog, made
siles.
available via the World Data Centers, helps to
bring many potentially unidentified objects Into
the identifiable realm. In accordance with a memo
randum of agreement between NORAD and NASAs Goddard
Space Fl ight Center, the NORAD Space Defense Center
provides Goddard with data and Information concern
ing U. S. and foreign launches. Goddard, In turn,
is responsible for the release of unclassified sci
entific and technical Information on space vehicles
and their behavior. (5)
In addition to routine, surveiI lance and cataloging,
the Aerospace Defense Command also performs other
valuable functions. Consider, for a moment, the
spectacular disaster If a manned mission were to
collide with another satellite at the velocities of
space vehicles.

THE SATELLITE COLLISION RISK
The Space Defense Center helps to protect against
such collisions with a program called COMBO. COMBO
Is the acronym for Computation of Miss Between Or
bits and Is a program designed to compute the
points of closest approach between any satellite
and one or more other satellites. Generally, any
two satellites in orbit will have two points of
close approach during each orbital revolution.
These two points are referred to as relative
minima, and the smaller of the two Is the absolute
minimum. The absolute minimum, then, is the clos
est approach between the satellites In question.
The COMBO program can give a motion history and
path prediction for each satellite for any points
that fall within a certain specified minimum sepa
ration. The relative minima are determined by com
puting the relative positions at a predetermined
interval using an orbit representation subroutine.
When the program recognizes that the distance be
tween the two objects of interest Is near minimum,
It iterates using a Newton-Raphson technique to de
termine where, in the time interval, the relative
minimum will actually occur. The data output gives
satellite positions in various coordinate systems,
including inertial coordinates, and relative posi
tion and velocity of one satellite with respect to
the other.(6)
The important consideration in this regard Is that
COMBO provides a predicted separation distance be2-17

tween two predicted satellite positions. The ac
tual accuracy of COMBO, is, therefore, directly re
lated to the accuracy of observations provided by*
the SPADATS sensors and the accuracy of the orbit
representation model used. In general, miss dis
tance prediction accuracies have an uncertainty on
the order of two kilometers under ideal conditions,
so these data can serve to a I erf of a dangerous
proximity but cannot definitely predict a colli
sion.
Although the probability of collision between sat
ellites is remote, COMBO is run before and during
a I I manned missions to provide an extra measure of
safety for our astronauts in space. As the space
population continues to grow, the value of COMBO
also rises.
As pointed out earlier, the space population is in
creasing, but there is also an applicable decay
rate among satellites. Of the nearly 11,000 ob
jects placed into space since SPUTNIK I, only about
4,600 remain. The rest have either been intention
ally deorbited, as in recovery of astronaut vehi
cles, or have re-entered the atmosphere in
classical orbit decay.

DECAY PREDICTIONS

A decay prediction program is used by the Space De
fense Center to forecast the eventual decay of satellites in orbit. For decay purposes, we classify
satellites into two general categories: (1) smal-l
objects, known as "normal decays," usually less
than one square meter in size and expected to burn,
up completely in the earth's atmosphere; and (2)
larger objects which have a good ohance of surviv
ing reentry to earth impact. We call satellites in
this second category TIP decays.
TIP is an acronym for Tracking and Impact Predic
tion, a task formally levied on Aerospace Defense
Command by the Air Force Chief of Staff in 1967.(7)
The Chief originally called the function Terminal
Impact Prediction, and although the name has
evolved to Tracking and Impact Prediction, the
acronym survived. TIP supports the international
agreements., mentioned earlier, regarding liability
for damage caused by debris and measures to prevent
risk of outbreak of nuclear war.
Normally, thirty days prior to decay, the Space De
fense Center will begin to closely monitor a TIP
Before the final prediction is made,
satellite.
seven TIP decay messages will be transmitted at es
tablished intervals to various government agencies.

At six and again at two hours prior to decay, the
Space Defense Center recommends to the NOR/^O Com
mand Post whether or not to report the TIP to the
National Military Command Center as a "significant
The criterion for a significant
space event."
space event is simply any TIP satellite whose pre
dicted impact falls within plus or minus 15 minutes
of the Soviet landmass. Because a satellite pend
ing decay travels approximately 250 nautical miles
per .minute, the criterion envelope extends 3,750
nautical miles from the U.S.S.R. When the National
Military Command Center is advised of a significant
space event, it, in turn, notifies various agencies
up to and including the President if certain re
porting criteria are met.
The complexity of TIP prediction can be appreciated
by briefly analyzing some of the associated limita
tions and technical problems. These fall into the
limitations due to
following general categories:
sensor locations; atmospheric density model errors;
satellite altitude changes and the resultant "drag
effects;" and ballistic re-entry phenomena.
Despite the proliferation of optical and radar sen
sors, the fact remains that we can observe a sateII ite for only small arcs along its total elliptical
Additionally, all but two of our current
path.
sensors are in the northern hemisphere; therefore,
balanced orbit coverage is also not possible. Con
sequently, a TIP satellite could actually go unob
served for five or six hours, a significant limita
tion for an object within a few hours of decay.
Hence, the ability to predict a satellite's posi"tion when it is not in sensor coverage is vitally
important. Unfortunately, prediction fs also af
fected by the orbit -determination problems men
tioned earlier.
Because of these limitations, impact prediction is
Therefore, a credence or
not an exact science.
confidence window is assigned to each TIP predic
tion. Confidence in decay prediction is defined as
plus or minus 20 percent of the elapsed time be
tween the last sensor observation and the predicted
time of decay. Because of the limited number of
sensors, this figure has historically translated to
an average window of plus or minute 5,700 nautical
miles. Even if we consider the best possible case
for the two hour prediction (i.e., a sensor obser
vation exactly two hours before the predicted
decay), the best confidence window that could be
associated with this is 20? of two hours, or plus
or minus 24 minutes, which translates to about
12,000 nautical miles along the satellite's course
of travel.
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To complicate this situation, unpredictable anom
alies can occur which drastically change a satel
lited decay. For example, in one actual case, the
satellite "skipped" off the upper reaches of the
atmosphere and remained in orbit for one and a half
revolutions beyond the two-hour predicted decay
point. An opposite effect is seen when a stable
satellite suddenly becomes unstable and commences
to tumble as it impinges upon the atmosphere in
which case it is very likely to decay earlier than
pred icted.
To focus on these aspects of the TIP program, let ! s
consider what is, to date, the decay that has at
tracted the greatest public attention: the decay
of the Soviet COSMOS 954 and its impact in Canada.

COSMOS 954
Space Detection and Tracking System sensors ob
served the degenerating orbit of COSMOS 954 during
October and November of 1977, and original calcula
tions produced a decay date in mid-April 1978.
These predictions persisted as late as January 4,
1978, when the Space Defense Center analysts still
predicted an April re-entry. They did, however,
caveat their prediction with, "If it remains
stable." Two days later, the stability criterion
was violated—COSMOS 954 had begun tumbling at
about one-quarter revolution per minute. Histori
cally, re-entry of near earth satellites occurs be
tween two and five weeks after the onset of tumble.
An average TIP satellite requires about 20 computer
runs or about five hours of computation time.
COSMOS 954 was averaging three times normal due to
high national interest.
On January 21, the prediction was for a 40 hour
confidence window spanning January 24 and 25. Two
days later, the prediction was for 7:55AM Eastern
Although this
Standard Time (EST) on the 24th.
prediction eventually proved to be "right on," the
left con
window
confidence
hour
10
minus
plus or
siderable uncertainty as to impact location.
One day before re-entry, the decay prediction time
was plus or minus five hours from 10:03 /W EST on
the 24th. At 10 hours prior to decay, the predic
tion was for 8:43 AM EST on the 24th, plus or minus
The six and two hour predictions
three hours.
showed a 95? probability that if the debris struck
a landmass, it would not be the Soviet Union. The
decay of COSMOS 954 did not meet the previously
mentioned criteria for a significant space event.

The final prediction came after the fact and
chiefly as a result of visual sighting and data
from a Hawaiian site; 7:56 AM EST plus or minus
three minutes; area indicated—Great Slave Lake in
Canada.
As stated earlier, sensor coverage Is one limita
tion of the SPADATS system that affects our TIP
capability. For COSMOS 954s last nine hours of
flight, only 25 minutes of observational data was
obtained. That is, sensors "saw" only 4.8 percent
of the last nine hours flight path— everything else
was prediction.

SKYLAB
The preceding figures may give some Insight into
the concern over the decay and re-entry of SKYLAB
later this year. While probability favors an Insig
nificant impact into the ocean, "the Aerospace De
fense Command will apply more man hours and more
computer time to TIP predictions for SKYLAB than
for any previous decay. Data sharing with other
agencies will jump from routine to maximum.
SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCIES
Routine data sharing and support to other agencies
by Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) Is handled by
the NORAD Combat Operations Center Technical and
Data Support Division. This is the single point of
contact for SPADATS requests from all agencies In
Support requests from
volved in DOD activities.
civilian scientific organizations are made via
NASA/ADCOM In
NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center.
terface is via the Aeronautics ar>d Astronautics Co
ordinating Board, a highly effective means of maxi
mizing the benefits derived from NASA programs for
defense use, and, in turn, assuring that the tech
nology developed in military programs is available
for civil applications.

CONCLUSION
The USAF SPACETRACK System, as an Integrated world
wide single manager system, will continue to be an
active partner In the overalI U. S. space program.
Looking ahead, Aerospace Defense Command Is cur
rently planning and programming additional radar
and optical sensors to add to the SPADATS network
and to decrease some of the I Imitations pointed out
in this discussion. Economic constraints prevent
us from ever having sufficient ground-based sensors
to see a sate I I Ite everywhere in Its orbit; how-
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ever, long-range future plans put state-of-the-art
sensor technology on satellites in deep space.
This space-based system will have an unrestricted
view of all objects in earth orbit and a down-link
data system to what will by then be the Space
Operations Center (a planned evolution of the Space
And, this future system will
Defense Center).
continue the mission precedent established by the
present system, monitoring activities in space to
help preserve the use of outer space by all nations
for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of man
kind.(9)

Satellite Control Facility, other AFETR tracking
radars, and NASA tracking and detection sensors.
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APPENDIX
The SPADATS Sensors: (10)
Dedicated sensors—NORAD/ADCOM assigned sensors
whose primary mission is satellite detection and
tracking :
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